Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/184512 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Citation: 
[Journal:] DANUBE: Law, Economics and Social Issues Review [ISSN:] 1804-8285 [Volume:] 7 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] De Gruyter [Place:] Warsaw [Year:] 2016 [Pages:] 145-160
Publisher: 
De Gruyter, Warsaw
Abstract: 
This paper provides a brief review of the state of knowledge in the field of agency theory. The managerial power approach assumes that a chief executive officer is able to affect the scale of his or her pay. However, Kaplan (2012) and others see a different picture of the corporate-governance landscape, hence they provide certain market-based explanations for high compensation. Our paper examines the relationship between a firm's performance and the amount of managerial compensation, and the ability of a CEO to affect a board's decision regarding his or her total compensation. The dataset consists of 75 companies traded in the capital market in the US. Our panel dataset covers a 10-year period from 2004 to 2013. We developed a single equation panel data model. The resulting parameter values provide a different picture of CEO power and the interconnection between a firm's performance and CEO pay in both sectors
Subjects: 
Agency Problem
Incentive Plan
Board of Directors
CEO Compensation
Realized Pay
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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