Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18680
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Riedel, Frank | en |
dc.contributor.author | Wolfstetter, Elmar | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:52:07Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:52:07Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18680 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The present note analyzes the Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auction with arbitrarily manybidders with decreasing marginal valuations under complete information. We show that thegame is solvable by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies if the efficientallocation assigns at least one unit to every player and if bid increments are sufficiently small.In that unique equilibrium, bidders immediately reduce their demand to the efficientallocation, and the auction ends in the first round of bidding. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1315 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D45 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D44 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Simultaneous Ascending Auction | en |
dc.subject.keyword | weak dominance | en |
dc.subject.keyword | multi-unit auctions | en |
dc.subject.keyword | game theory | en |
dc.subject.stw | Auktionstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Vollkommene Information | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending bid auctions | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 477398634 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
Files in This Item:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.