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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Daido, Kohei | en |
dc.contributor.author | Itoh, Hideshi | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:53:02Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:53:02Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18808 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We attempt to formulate and explain two types of self-fulfilling prophecy, called thePygmalion effect (if a supervisor thinks her subordinates will succeed, they are more likely tosucceed) and the Galatea effect (if a person thinks he will succeed, he is more likely tosucceed). To this purpose, we extend a simple agency model with moral hazard and limitedliability by introducing a model of reference dependent preferences (RDP) by K'szegi andRabin (2004). We show that the agent with high expectations about his performance can beinduced to choose high effort with low-powered incentives. We then show that the principal'sexpectation has an important role as an equilibrium selection device. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1444 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M12 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M54 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M52 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.jel | B49 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | self-fulfilling prophecy | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Pygmalion effect | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Galatea effect | en |
dc.subject.keyword | reference dependent preferences | en |
dc.subject.keyword | agency model | en |
dc.subject.keyword | moral hazard | en |
dc.subject.stw | Agency Theory | en |
dc.subject.stw | Leistungsanreiz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Leistungsmotivation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Nutzen | en |
dc.subject.stw | Moral Hazard | en |
dc.subject.stw | Beschränkte Haftung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | The Pygmalion effect : an agency model with reference dependent preferences | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 48516292X | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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