Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/188889 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper No. 1377
Verlag: 
Queen's University, Department of Economics, Kingston (Ontario)
Zusammenfassung: 
When self-interested agents compete for scarce resources, they often exaggerate the promise of their activities. As such, principals must consider both the quality of each opportunity and each agent’s credibility. We show that principals are better off with less transparency because they gain access to better investments. This is due to a complementarity between the agents' effort provision and their ability to exaggerate. As such, it is suboptimal for principals to prevent misreporting, even if doing so is costless. This helps explain why exaggeration is ubiquitous during allocation decisions: money management, analyst coverage, private equity fundraising, and venture capital investments.
Schlagwörter: 
Auditing
Monitoring
Financial Reporting
Capital Budgeting
Exaggeration
JEL: 
D83
G14
G31
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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