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Erscheinungsjahr: 
1991
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper No. 809
Verlag: 
Queen's University, Department of Economics, Kingston (Ontario)
Zusammenfassung: 
We re-examine the regulatory role of a public firm in an environment of private but correlated information about industry costs. We study three regimes of mixed market interaction involving both public and private firms: a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, an asymmetric Bayesian equilibrium in which the public firm is able to commit to production before the private firms and a mechanism in which the regulator designs an incentive compatible schedule for the industry. We find that a public firms plays an important strategic informational role which strengthens its role as a disciplinary regulatory instrument. Further, we find that this strategic informational role is considerably enchanced as we move from indirect regulatory schemes to direct regulation.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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