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Erscheinungsjahr: 
1991
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper No. 821
Verlag: 
Queen's University, Department of Economics, Kingston (Ontario)
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper compares ad valorem and specific taxation in two models of oligopoly, with and without free entry. Predominantly ad valorem taxation implies a relative low consumer price, high tax revenue and (when entry is precluded) low profits. Ad valorem taxation dominates specific from the welfare perspective: the set of circumstances under which (with free entry) specific taxation raises welfare is a strict subset of that in which ad valorem taxation is welfare-improving, and in both models the maximization of consumer welfare subject to a binding revenue constraint requires maximum reliance on ad valorem taxation.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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