Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/189277 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
1999
Series/Report no.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper No. 987
Publisher: 
Queen's University, Department of Economics, Kingston (Ontario)
Abstract: 
This paper contributes to the search theory of unemployment by endogenously deriving matching functions and surplus sharing rule for skilled and unskilled workers from a wage-posting game. In contrast to previous wage posting models, here both sides of the market are heterogeneous and the resulted matching function can exhibit non-constant returns to scale. The model provides useful explanations for the observed dynamic patterns of within-skill and between-skill wage differentials in the 1970s and 1980s.
Subjects: 
Wage posting
Wage differential
Matching
Technological progress
JEL: 
C78
J31
J64
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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