Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/189331 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper No. 1051
Verlag: 
Queen's University, Department of Economics, Kingston (Ontario)
Zusammenfassung: 
Exchanges and other trading platforms are often vertically integrated to carry out trading and settlement as one operation. We show that these vertical silos can prevent the full realization of efficincy gains from horizontal consolidation of trading and settlement platforms. Independent of the gains from such consolidation, when costs of settlement are private information, a merger of vertical silos cannot be designed to always ensure efficient trading and settlement after the merger. Furthermore, we show that efficiency can nevertheless be guaranteed either by delegating the operation of settlement platforms to agents or by forcing competition across vertical silos through cross-listings.
Schlagwörter: 
Clearing and Settlement
Cross-listing
Vertical and Horizontal Integration
Mechanism Design
JEL: 
C73
G20
G34
L22
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
581.01 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.