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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18952
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Lengwiler, Yvan | en |
dc.contributor.author | Wolfstetter, Elmar | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:54:02Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:54:02Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18952 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This invites corruption. We proposea model of corruption in which the auctioneer orchestrates bid rigging by inviting a bidder toeither lower or raise his bid, whichever is more profitable. We characterize equilibriumbidding in first- and second-price auctions, show how corruption distorts the allocation, andwhy both the auctioneer and bidders may have a vested interest in maintaining corruption. Bidrigging is initiated by the auctioneer after bids have been submitted in order to minimizeillegal contact and to realize the maximum gain from corruption. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1488 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D44 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | auctions | en |
dc.subject.keyword | procurement | en |
dc.subject.keyword | corruption | en |
dc.subject.keyword | right of first refusal | en |
dc.subject.keyword | numerical methods | en |
dc.subject.stw | Auktionstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Korruption | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Bid rigging : an analysis of corruption in auctions | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 50046619X | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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