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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18955
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Huber, Bernd | en |
dc.contributor.author | Runkel, Marco | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:54:03Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:54:03Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18955 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Empirical evidence from the U.S. and the European Union suggests that regions whichcontribute to interregional redistribution face weaker borrowing constraints than regionswhich benefit from interregional redistribution. This paper presents an argument in favor ofsuch differentiated budgetary institutions. It develops a two-period model of a federationconsisting of two types of regions. The federal government redistributes from one type ofregions (contributors) to the other type (recipients). It is shown that a fiscal constitution withlax budget rules for contributors and strict budget rules for recipients solves the self-selectionproblem the federal government faces in the presence of asymmetric information regardingexogenous characteristics of the regions. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1491 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H77 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H74 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | asymmetric information | en |
dc.subject.keyword | interregional redistribution | en |
dc.subject.keyword | borrowing rules | en |
dc.subject.stw | Finanzausgleich | en |
dc.subject.stw | Öffentliche Schulden | en |
dc.subject.stw | Region | en |
dc.subject.stw | Asymmetrische Information | en |
dc.subject.stw | Finanzföderalismus | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Interregional redistribution and budget institutions under asymmetric information | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 500467706 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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