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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
School of Economics Discussion Papers No. 1718
Verlag: 
University of Kent, School of Economics, Canterbury
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper, we show that a concept of aggregation can hold in network games. Breaking up large networks into smaller pieces, which can be replaced by representative players, leads to a coarse-grained description of strategic interactions. This method of summarizing complex strategic interactions by simple ones can be applied to compute Nash equilibria. We also provide an application to public goods in networks to show the usefulness of our results. In particular, we highlight network architectures that cannot prevent free-riding in public good network games. Finally, we show that aggregation enhances the stability of a Nash equilibrium
Schlagwörter: 
aggregation
modular decomposition
network games
public goods
stability
JEL: 
C72
D31
D85
H41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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