Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/190440 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers No. MT-DP - 2016/16
Verlag: 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Budapest
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper considers trade agreements in a sufficiently general framework to encompass both imperfectly competitive market structures and income effects in government objectives. We show that governments choose globally efficient policies if they act as if they do not value the impact of their policies on their terms of trade. The results confirm that additional international externalities that arise in imperfectly competitive settings are the result of government failure to equate markups between sectors with domestic policies, not demandside factors.
Schlagwörter: 
trade agreements
income effects
non-homothetic preferences
JEL: 
F12
F13
F15
ISBN: 
978-615-5594-52-6
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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