Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/192262 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers No. 280
Publisher: 
Statistics Norway, Research Department, Oslo
Abstract: 
This paper reports an experiment that studies the behavior of a monopolist on sequential auction markets for tradable permits. Using six sessions in a triple ABA crossover design, we investigate the cost-effectiveness of permit allocations and the division of trade gains on sequential bid, offer, and double auction markets. The main result is that cost-effectiveness and supra-competitive profits accrued by the monopolist are observed on all the three auction markets.
Subjects: 
Market power
tradable permits
and experimental economics.
JEL: 
L12
Q25
C91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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