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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Papers No. 505
Verlag: 
Statistics Norway, Research Department, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
Recent contributions show that climate agreements with broad participation can be implemented as weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria in simple models of greenhouse gas abatement where each country has a binary choice between cooperating (i.e., abate emissions) or defecting (no abatement). Here we show that this result carries over to a model where countries have a continuum of emission choices. Indeed, a Pareto-efficient climate agreement can always be implemented as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium, for a sufficiently high discount factor. This means that one need not trade-off a "narrow but deep" treaty with a "broad but shallow" treaty.
Schlagwörter: 
Climate
non-cooperative game-theory
repeated games
weakly renegotiation-proof agreements
JEL: 
C72
F53
Q54
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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