Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/192608 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Papers No. 626
Verlag: 
Statistics Norway, Research Department, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
Abstract: Motivated by the climate problem, this paper examines some effects of international cap & trade when national quotas result from strategic choice. In contrast to the fairly optimistic tone of closely related literature, the tenor of our results is pessimistic. We find that though an international permit market may flourish, it will mainly redistribute income. As far as emissions reductions are concerned, the classical, rather inefficient, noncooperative outcome will prevail, regardless of the presence of cap & trade.
Schlagwörter: 
International emissions trading
global externality
endogenous endowments
emissions taxes.
JEL: 
C72
D62
Q54
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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