Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/192742 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Papers No. 760
Verlag: 
Statistics Norway, Research Department, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
This article studies how a firm fosters formal and informal interaction among its employees to create a collective identity and positively influence their effort. We develop an agency model, in which employees have both a personal and a social ideal for effort. The firm does not observe the personal ideals, which gives rise to an adverse selection problem, but can make its workforce more sensitive to the social ideal by allocating part of working hours to social interaction. We show that there are two reasons why the firm invests in social capital. First, it reinforces the effectiveness of monetary incentives. Second, by creating a shared identity in the workforce, the firm is able to reduce the adverse selection problem. We also show that the firm allocates more time to bonding activities when employees have low personal ideals for effort or when they are more heterogeneous as regards these ideals.
Schlagwörter: 
Agency theory
Social interaction
Social norms
norm regulation
JEL: 
D2
D8
J3
M5
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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