Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/192841 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Papers No. 859
Verlag: 
Statistics Norway, Research Department, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the relationship between early claiming of pensions and incentives in the highly flexible Norwegian public pension system, measuring incentives to claim based on an estimated model for expected longevity. Despite a strong correlation between incentives and claiming decisions, the additional costs to public budgets arising from this selection turn out to be modest. Based on analyses exploiting only variation in expected pensions generated by variation in parental longevities and only claiming of pensions not in conjunction with retirement, we conclude that part of the selection is active: Some individuals claim pensions early because they gain from doing so.
Schlagwörter: 
social security
pension benefits
retirement
annuity
JEL: 
H55
J14
J26
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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