Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/192857 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Papers No. 875
Verlag: 
Statistics Norway, Research Department, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper modifies and extends the aggregate equilibrium models for matching markets developed earlier in the literature. Agents in the matching market search for a match among potential partners, including agreements about a flexible contract, such as hours and wage combinations in the labor market. Under general utility representations that are non-transferable and assuming the matching is stable, we derive a probabilistic framework for the probability of realizing a particular match, including the choice of contract. We also show that the popular transferable utility model with transferable utilities can be viewed as a limiting case within our modelling framework. The framework is practical to apply for empirical analysis and is at the same time sufficiently general to accommodate essential features of matching markets with heterogeneous agents.
Schlagwörter: 
Matching markets
Aggregation
Latent choice sets
Random utility matching models
JEL: 
J22
C51
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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