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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Cogent Economics & Finance [ISSN:] 2332-2039 [Volume:] 5 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Taylor & Francis [Place:] Abingdon [Year:] 2017 [Pages:] 1-30
Verlag: 
Taylor & Francis, Abingdon
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper assesses the contribution of country governance structures to resolving the unsettled crowding-in-crowding-out hypothesis of public and private investments and arresting the recent fall of public investment in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Within an Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel Framework, we estimate a derived accelerator model that allows for inclusion of country governance structures (control of corruption, political stability, rule of law, governance effectiveness, voice and accountability and regulatory quality) in a public investment model. The results, based on data from SSA, suggest that country governance structures that control corruption, ensure political stability, regulatory quality and rule of law enhance public investment in SSA. But the presence of these governance structures does not curtail the crowding out effect of private investment on public investment. Thus, policies directed at improving public investment in SSA should target governance structures in addition to the conventional factors.
Schlagwörter: 
public investment
country governance structures
crowding-in-out hypothesis and SSA
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