Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/197700 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1027
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
We propose simple dual-channel models in which an upstream manufacturer trades with a downstream retailer that is able to engage in cost-reducing activities. When the manufacturer determines whether to encroach on the downstream market after observing the retailer's effort level, the threat of manufacturer encroachment can work as a disciplinary device to induce the retailer to aggressively engage in cost reductions, after which the manufacturer refrains from encroaching further on the downstream market. The disciplinary device is more likely to improve consumer welfare and social welfare, although the encroachment itself can harm social welfare.
Schlagwörter: 
Encroachment
dual-channel model
investment
vertical relation
JEL: 
L13
M11
D43
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
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