Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/198837 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7477
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
What are the incentives for governments to coordinate their policies internationally when there is model disagreement and uncertainty? We build a model where countries disagree on policy targets and how policies affect the economies, and show that uncertainty not only determines the type of cooperative policy but also whether countries want to cooperate at all. Countries facing larger model disagreement also need to face larger uncertainty with respect to policy spillovers to agree on cooperation. Thus, uncertainty on spillovers can be a substitute for model agreement.
Subjects: 
policy coordination
uncertainty
ideological commitment
model disagreement
JEL: 
F42
F53
F55
F68
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.