Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/198873 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7513
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
This paper studies mechanism design with limited commitment where agents have correlated persistent types over the infinite horizon. The mechanism designer now faces the informed-principal problem in addition to usual issues with i.i.d. types. The paper first shows revelation principle in this context then shows sufficient conditions for obtaining full-commitment solutions with limited commitment.
Subjects: 
mechanism design
limited commitment
revelation principle
informed-principal problem
persistence
correlated types
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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