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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20260
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Friebel, Guido | en |
dc.contributor.author | Guriev, Sergei | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T16:12:48Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T16:12:48Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20260 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We introduce financial constraints in a theoretical analysis of illegal immigration.Intermediaries finance the migration costs of wealth-constrained migrants, who entertemporary servitude contracts to pay back the debt. These debt/labor contracts are moreeasily enforceable in the illegal than in the legal sector of the host country. Hence, whenmoving from the illegal to the legal sector becomes more costly, for instance, because ofstricter deportation policies, fewer immigrants default on debt. This reduces the risks forintermediaries, who are then more willing to finance illegal migration. Stricter deportationpolicies may thus increase rather than decrease the ex ante flow of illegal migrants. We alsoshow that stricter deportation policies worsen the skill composition of immigrants. Whilestricter border controls decrease overall immigration, they may also result in an increase ofdebt-financed migration. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x1025 | en |
dc.subject.jel | N21 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J61 | en |
dc.subject.jel | O17 | en |
dc.subject.jel | O15 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | illegal migration | en |
dc.subject.keyword | wealth constraints | en |
dc.subject.keyword | indentured servitude | en |
dc.subject.keyword | financial contracting | en |
dc.subject.stw | Illegale Einwanderung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Private Verschuldung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verschuldungsrestriktion | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitsvertrag | en |
dc.subject.stw | Migrationspolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Smuggling Humans: A Theory of Debt-Financed Migration | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 37932931X | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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