Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/202700 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 12354
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
In this article, we empirically study the survival of the ruling party in parliamentary democracies using a hazard rate model. We define survival of a crisis as being successful in a critical vote in the parliament. We develop a general probabilistic model of political crises and test it empirically. We find that during crises, parties in the parliament are likely to vote independently of each other. Thus, we receive as an empirical result what the previous voting power literature assumed.
Schlagwörter: 
voting power
coalitions
cabinet duration
Shapley-Shubik index
Rae index
JEL: 
D72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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