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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20419
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Hunt, Jennifer | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T16:13:58Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T16:13:58Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20419 | - |
dc.description.abstract | I study data on bribes actually paid by individuals to public officials, viewing the resultsthrough a theoretical lens that considers the implications of trust networks. A bond of trustmay permit an implicit quid pro quo to substitute for a bribe, which reduces corruption.Appropriate networks are more easily established in small towns, by long-term residents ofareas with many other long-term residents, and by individuals in regions with many residentstheir own age. I confirm that the prevalence of bribery is lower under these circumstances,using the International Crime Victim Surveys. I also find that older people, who have had timeto develop a network, bribe less. These results highlight the uphill nature of the battle againstcorruption faced by policy-makers in rapidly urbanizing countries with high fertility. I show thatvictims of (other) crimes bribe all types of public officials more than non-victims, and arguethat both their victimization and bribery stem from a distrustful environment. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x1179 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D6 | en |
dc.subject.jel | O1 | en |
dc.subject.jel | K4 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | networks | en |
dc.subject.keyword | crime | en |
dc.subject.keyword | corruption | en |
dc.subject.stw | Korruption | en |
dc.subject.stw | Vertrauen | en |
dc.title | Trust and Bribery : The Role of the Quid Pro Quo and the Link with Crime | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 389183512 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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