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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20564
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Roider, Andreas | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T16:15:02Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T16:15:02Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20564 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The present paper aims to contribute to the literature on the foundations of incompletecontracts by providing conditions under which simple delegation of authority is the solution tothe complete-contracting problem of the parties. We consider a hold-up framework whereboth parties profit from an investment that raises the value of an asset. Delegation turns outto be optimal if (i) the decision-dependent parts of the payoffs of the parties are linear in theasset value, and (ii) decisions have no investment-independent effect. If overinvestmentmight be an issue, delegation, however, with restricted competencies is optimal if someadditional continuity requirements are met. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x1298 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L14 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D23 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L22 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | delegation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | decentralization | en |
dc.subject.keyword | authority | en |
dc.subject.keyword | incomplete contracts | en |
dc.subject.keyword | hold-up | en |
dc.subject.keyword | property rights | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kooperative Führung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Dezentrale Organisation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Unvollständiger Vertrag | en |
dc.subject.stw | Eigentumsrechtstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Investition | en |
dc.subject.stw | Sunk Costs | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)complete Contract | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 464451868 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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