Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/206295 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] BRQ Business Research Quarterly [ISSN:] 2340-9436 [Volume:] 17 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Elsevier España [Place:] Barcelona [Year:] 2014 [Pages:] 31-46
Verlag: 
Elsevier España, Barcelona
Zusammenfassung: 
Some authors have demonstrated the value of egalitarian sharing rules in teams, even when team members have distinct abilities and make different contributions to team performance. However, we show the appearance of an undesirable component of rational altruism when marginal productivities differ across team members and an egalitarian sharing rule is used. We call this new component of rational altruism the Perverse Element of Rational Altruism (PERA). The presence of the PERA decreases team efficiency. In this sense, and considering several scenarios, an analysis of welfare implications and the evolution of team efficiency are presented."
Schlagwörter: 
Asymmetric team members
Rational altruism
Second best optimal sharing rules
Perverse Element of Rational Altruism
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Dokumentart: 
Article

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.