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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20671
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Gächter, Simon | en |
dc.contributor.author | Riedl, Arno | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T16:15:51Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T16:15:51Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20671 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Theoretical research on claims problems has concentrated on normative properties andaxiomatizations of solution concepts. We complement these analyses by empirical evidenceon the predictability of three classical solution concepts in a bankruptcy problem. Weexamine both people's impartial normative evaluations as well as their actual negotiationbehavior in a bargaining with claims environment. We measure people's judgments on thenormative attractiveness of solution concepts with the help of a survey and also observeactual agreements in a bargaining experiment with real money at stake. We find that theproportional solution is the normatively most attractive rule, whereas actual negotiationagreements are closest to the 'constrained equal award' solution. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x1375 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D63 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C78 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C92 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | bankruptcy problems with claims | en |
dc.subject.keyword | proportional rule | en |
dc.subject.keyword | equal-awards rule | en |
dc.subject.keyword | equallosses rule | en |
dc.subject.keyword | fairness | en |
dc.subject.keyword | laboratory experiment | en |
dc.subject.keyword | vignette | en |
dc.subject.stw | Konkursverwaltung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Gerechtigkeit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verhandlungstheorie | en |
dc.title | Dividing Justly in Bargaining Problems with Claims: Normative Judgments and Actual Negotiations | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 476090067 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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