Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/208422 
Year of Publication: 
1999
Series/Report no.: 
Working paper No. 11-99
Publisher: 
Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics, Frederiksberg
Abstract: 
Political involvement in the operation of an enterprise, whether it is private or state owned, creates opportunities for interest groups to influence the allocation of resources. Resource allocation transfers rent both between unions and private owners within the firm and between these organized insiders and the disorganized taxpayers. I investigate how insiders`lobby activities distorts resource allocation in a state owned enterprise. Then I show that efficiency in labor allocation is improved when cash flow is rights affects efficiency in resource allocation when there are restrictions on side payments between the interest groups.
Subjects: 
Ownership Structure
Influence Externality
Side Payments
resource Allocation
JEL: 
D21
D23
D78
H11
L33
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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