Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/208435 
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Working paper No. 13-2000
Publisher: 
Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics, Frederiksberg
Abstract: 
This paper challenges the traditional view that unemployment is high because insiders determine the union wage. The insiders in this paper are characterized by being more efficient when they search for a job than the outsiders, implying that they experience relatively less unemployment. We assume that wages are determined by a monopoly union and further that a union leader is elected by a majority voting rule. Insiders may prefer a lower wage than outsiders, implying the possibility of lower unemployment.
Subjects: 
Insiders and Outsiders
Search
Unemployment
JEL: 
J20
J50
J60
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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