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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working paper No. 1-2002
Verlag: 
Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics, Frederiksberg
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze how the structure of organizational form of legislative institutions affects interest groups ’incentives to lobby.Lobbying is modelled the strategic provision of information by an interest group to a multi-person legislature.We show that the effectiveness of lobbying lies in changing the viable policy coalitions.We show in a multi-period policy framework that a distinguishing feature between the US Congress and European parliamentary systems – the vote of confidence procedure - can significantly change the incentives for interest group lobbying.
Schlagwörter: 
Organizational form
legislative institutions
Lobbying
Parliamentary systems
Politics
Interest groups
JEL: 
A10
E10
E60
H00
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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