Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/208492 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working paper No. 17-2004
Verlag: 
Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics, Frederiksberg
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper examines the implications of that workers may not be able to estimate their true costs of acquiring skills. Consequently, too few workers may acquire skills. This allows for the possibility that subsidizing education is welfare improving. Furthermore, if the presence of skill-biased technological shocks increase unemployment, this may explain why the market it-self cannot respond to this by making it sufficiently attractive to acquire skills. Consequently, the trade-off in-between subsidizing education and thereby reducing unemployment and optimizing welfare may be eliminated. We analyse this issue in a simple educational model and next in a search equilibrium model including a skill choice decision.
Schlagwörter: 
Education
subsidies
efficiency
unemployment
JEL: 
I20
J64
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.