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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working paper No. 2-2011
Verlag: 
Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics, Frederiksberg
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper develops a four sector equilibrium search and matching model with informal sector employment opportunities and educational choice. We show that underground activities reduce educational at- tainments if informal employment opportunities mainly are available to low educated workers. More zealous enforcement policy will in this case improve educational incentives as it reduces the attractiveness of remaining a low educated worker. Characterizing the optimal enforce- ment policies, we nd that relatively more audits should be targeted towards the sector employing low educated workers, elsewise a too low stock of educated workers is materialized.
Schlagwörter: 
labor market
education
JEL: 
J08
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
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Dokumentart: 
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