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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20930
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Zylberberg, André | en |
dc.contributor.author | Cahuc, Pierre | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T16:17:56Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T16:17:56Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 1999 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20930 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We analyze how wage setting institutions and job-security provisions interact onunemployment. The assumption that wages are renegotiated by mutual agreement only isintroduced in a matching model with endogenous job destruction – la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) in order to get wage profiles with proper microfoundations. Then, it is shown that job protection policies influence the wage distribution and that government mandated severance transfers from employers to workers are not any more neutral, as in the standard matching model where wages are continuously renegotiated: In our framework high redundancy transfers influence employment. Moreover, the assumption of enegotiation by mutual agreement allows us to introduce a minimum wage in a coherent way, and tostudy its interactions with job protection policies. Our computational exercises suggest thatredundancy transfers and administrative dismissal restrictions have negligeableunemployment effects when wages are flexible or when the minimum wage is low, but a dramatic positive impact on unemployment when there is a high minimum wage. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x95 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J64 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H29 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J23 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J38 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J41 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Unemployment | en |
dc.subject.keyword | job protection | en |
dc.subject.keyword | minimum wage | en |
dc.subject.keyword | matching models | en |
dc.subject.keyword | renegotiation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitslosigkeit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Mindestlohn | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kündigungsschutz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitszeitflexibilisierung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Job Protection, Minimum Wage and Unemployment | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 834467739 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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