Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20945
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Brunello, Giorgio | en |
dc.contributor.author | Graziano, Clara | en |
dc.contributor.author | Parigi, Bruno Maria | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T16:18:03Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T16:18:03Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2000 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20945 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper studies the turnover of board of directors members in a sample of 72 companieslisted on the Milan Stock Exchange during the period 1988-1996. We investigate whetherboard members change more frequently when company performance is poor, as theliterature suggests, and whether and how the ownership structure of Italian companiesaffects these relationships. We find that there is a statistically significant and negativerelationship between firm performance and CEO turnover and that this relationship dependson the ownership structure of firms. Turnover is lower in family controlled firms and higher infirms that experienced a change in the controlling shareholder. The latter firms also have astronger turnover-performance relationship. We find evidence supporting the hypothesis thatchanges in control are an extreme form of turnover. We also find evidence of a monitoringrole of the second largest shareholder. Also the turnover of top executives exhibits anegative relationship with performance. Board turnover instead is unrelated to performancebut is related to the firm?s ownership structure. Overall our findings suggest that thecharacteristics of the Italian economy deeply affect the turnover of directors and haveimplications that go beyond the specific case study. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x105 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J63 | en |
dc.subject.jel | G34 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Board of directors | en |
dc.subject.keyword | corporate governance | en |
dc.subject.keyword | financial agency | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitsmobilität | en |
dc.subject.stw | Vorstand | en |
dc.subject.stw | Eigentümerstruktur | en |
dc.subject.stw | Corporate Governance | en |
dc.subject.stw | Unternehmensentwicklung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Italien | en |
dc.title | Ownership or Performance: What Determines Board of Directors' Turnover in Italy? | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 834517353 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
Files in This Item:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.