Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/209832 
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2004/7
Publisher: 
Norges Bank, Oslo
Abstract: 
This paper provides an examination of the ownership structure in Norwegian firms that announced repurchase plans during the period 1999 through 2001, as well as for groups of these firms conditional on whether they actually executed repurchases or not. By using detailed information on various ownership variables that can be related to corporate governance mechanisms, the paper also examines whether the propensity for firms to announce a repurchase program depends on the ownership composition. Some interesting patterns are found which are consistent with models where firms with potentially the highest agency problems use repurchases to mitigate agency costs. However, a high insider ownership in these firms may also suggest that asymmetric information, shareholder expropriation and entrenchment may also be motivations for why firms repurchase shares.
Subjects: 
stock repurchases
ownership structure
corporate governance
JEL: 
G10
G32
G35
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
ISBN: 
82-7553-236-1
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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