Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/210879 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ESRB Working Paper Series No. 104
Verlag: 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), European System of Financial Supervision, Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
We study optimal capital requirement regulation in a dynamic quantitative model in which nonfinancial firms, as well as households, hold deposits. Firms hold deposits for precautionary reasons and to facilitate the acquisition of production inputs. Our theoretical analysis identifies a novel general equilibrium channel that operates through firms' deposits and mitigates the cost of increasing capital requirements. We calibrate our model and find that the optimal capital requirement is 18.7% but only 13.6% in a comparable model in which only households hold deposits. Our novel channel accounts for most of the difference.
Schlagwörter: 
deposit insurance
capital requirements
idiosyncratic risk
safe assets
JEL: 
E21
G21
G32
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
978-92-9472-118-1
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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