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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IFN Working Paper No. 1248
Verlag: 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
International investment agreements have provoked intense criticism in the policy debate during recent years. Particularly contentious has been their "ISDS" mechanisms, which enable investors to litigate against host countries. This paper examines whether host countries would be better off with state-state dispute settlement (SSDS), as often alleged, assuming that SSDS cause political/diplomatic litigation costs that are not present with ISDS. Two separate reasons why host countries might benefit from SSDS are identified, but neither provides a convincing argument for host countries to move to SSDS. The paper concludes that host countries should reduce the stringency of their agreements, rather than introduce imperfections in the dispute settlement systems to reduce their bite.
Schlagwörter: 
ISDS
Expropriation
International investment agreements
Regulatory chill
JEL: 
F21
F23
F53
K33
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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