Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/211961 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bank of Finland Discussion Papers No. 28/2003
Verlag: 
Bank of Finland, Helsinki
Zusammenfassung: 
Many adverse selection models of standard one-period debt contracts are based on the following seemingly innocuous assumptions.First, entrepreneurs have private information about the quality of their return distributions.Second, return distributions are ordered by the monotone likelihood-ratio property.Third, financiers payoff functions are restricted to be monotonically non-decreasing in firm profits.Fourth, financial markets are competitive.We argue that debt is not an optimal contract in these models if there is only one (monopoly) financier rather than an infinite number of competitive financiers.
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
952-462-094-4
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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