Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/212044 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers No. 19/2006
Verlag: 
Bank of Finland, Helsinki
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper demonstrates that, even if depositors are fully rational and always choose the Pareto dominant equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria, a bank run may still occur when depositors' expectations of the bank's fundamentals do not change.More specifically, a bank run may occur when depositors learn that noisy bank-specific information is revealed, or when they learn that precise bank-specific information is not revealed.The results in this paper are consistent with empirical evidence about bank runs. It also implies that suspension of convertibility can improve the efficiency of bank runs.
Schlagwörter: 
bank run
banking panic
suspension of convertibility
JEL: 
G21
G28
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
952-462-302-1
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.