Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/212233 
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers No. 30/2012
Publisher: 
Bank of Finland, Helsinki
Abstract: 
This paper examines a class of interest rate rules that respond to public expectations and to lagged variables. Varying levels of commitment correspond to varying degrees of response to lagged output and targeting of the price level. If the response rises (unintentionally) above the optimal level, the outcome deteriorates severely. Hence, the optimal level of commitment is sensitive to the method of expectations formation and partial commitment is the robust, optimal policy.
Subjects: 
Learning
Monetary Policy
Interest Rate Rules
Commitment
Price Level Targeting
JEL: 
E52
E31
D84
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
ISBN: 
978-952-462-821-1
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.