Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/213516 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Development Research Working Paper Series No. 06/2019
Verlag: 
Institute for Advanced Development Studies (INESAD), La Paz
Zusammenfassung: 
The purpose of this paper is to show the shortcomings of incentive policies, specifically competitiveness, if they are designed without considering fundamentals of market development such as, level of demand, level of investment, and availability of alternative sources of supply. We focus on the analysis of the main market, financial, and economic variables in the Bolivia-Brazil Gas Supply Agreement, their relationship, development and dynamics through time and the current situation before the contract is renegotiated in 2019. Our analysis centers on the effective negotiation margin that Bolivia has calculated from the overall production costs of Bolivian gas (using EMV) vis a vis the opportunity cost of Brazil importing LNG. Using 10%-15% as discount rates and WTI prices between $50 and $60/bbl, the natural gas price result of EMV is between $ 4.96 and $ 7.99/MMbtu. Using the Bolivian tax incentive gas price should be between $2.29 and $5.16/MMbtu. Under the assumptions that WTI levels would be around $ 60/bbl, investors use a 15% discount rate to invest in Bolivia, incentive policy is in place, and the price of LNG is around $ 6.84/MMbtu; the opportunity cost of Brazil importing gas from Bolivia is $ -0.55/MMbtu. The same case without incentive policy will yield a $ -3.38/MMbtu. On the other hand, if the transport tariff is reduced the margin becomes positive under the assumption that the incentive policy is still in place. Therefore, as the price of LNG becomes more competitive through increase in supply (worldwide), Brazil will set its negotiation position around the price that they could import LNG on the short to medium term.
Schlagwörter: 
Netback prices
GSA
Gas Pricing
Gas Contract Negotiation
Virtual Hub
Expected Monetary Value
JEL: 
Q31
Q35
F15
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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