Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/214359 
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
CREMA Working Paper No. 2006-13
Publisher: 
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA), Basel
Abstract: 
The traditional economic approach to tax evasion does not appear to be particularly successful in explaining the extent of tax compliance. We argue instead that a psychological tax contract which establishes a fiscal exchange between the state and the citizens shapes tax compliance to a large extent. In that respect, a case study of Switzerland is useful because the small size of the cantons and their direct democratic political systems procedurally establish a close exchange relationship between taxpayers and tax authorities. In this paper, evidence is discussed on how tax evasion and tax morale in Switzerland evolved over time. In addition, the impact of economic, legal, socio-demographic, psychological and institutional factors on Swiss tax evasion is discussed.
Subjects: 
Tax Evasion
Tax Morale
Deterrence
Responsive Regulation
JEL: 
H26
H73
D73
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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