Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/214367 
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
CREMA Working Paper No. 2006-21
Publisher: 
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA), Basel
Abstract: 
The Swiss fiscal system is characterised by an extensive fiscal federalism with high fiscal autonomy at all governmental levels, by direct popular rights which include fiscal referenda at the cantonal and local levels, and by particular constitutional and/or statutory fiscal restraints in order to prevent excessive public debt. In this paper, the effects of these constitutional clauses on public deficit and debt are investigated. Using a panel of the 26 Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998, we provide evidence that fiscal constraints significantly reduce budget deficits, while direct democracy leads to significantly lower public debt.
Subjects: 
Direct Democracy
Referenda
Initiatives
Public Debt
Budget Deficits
JEL: 
H74
H77
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
322.96 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.