Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/214382 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
CREMA Working Paper No. 2007-08
Publisher: 
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA), Basel
Abstract: 
In the course of history a large number of politicians has been assassinated. A rational choice analysis is used to distinguish the expected marginal benefits of killing, and the marginal cost of attacking a politician. The comparative analysis of various equilibria helps us to gain insights into specific historical events. The analysis suggests that - in addition to well-known security measures - an extension of democracy, a rule by a committee of several politicians, more decentralization via the division of power and federalism, and a strengthening of civil society significantly reduce politicians' probability of being attacked and killed.
Subjects: 
Rational choice
democracy
dictatorship
assassination
deterrence
JEL: 
D01
D70
K14
K42
Z10
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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