Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/214470 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CREMA Working Paper No. 2010-12
Verlag: 
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA), Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper suggests that institutional factors which reward social net- works at the expenses of productivity can play an important role in ex- plaining brain drain. The e€ects of social networks on brain drain are analyzed in a decision theory framework with asymmetric information. We distinguish between the role of insidership and personal connections. The larger the cost of being an outsider, the smaller is the number and the average ability of researchers working in the domestic job market. Per- sonal connections partly compensate for this e€ect by attracting highly connected researchers back. However, starting from a world with no dis- tortions, personal connections also increase brain drain.
Schlagwörter: 
Brain Drain
Social Networks
Institutions
Asymmetric In- formation
Italian Academia
JEL: 
D82
F22
I20
J24
J44
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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