Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/214625 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 332
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
Trade credit is one of the most important sources of short-term finance in buyer-seller transactions.This paper studies a seller's trade credit provision decision in a situation of repeated contracting withincomplete information over the buyer's ability and willingness of payment compliance when theenforceability of formal contracts is uncertain. We show that selecting the payment terms of a trans-action corresponds to managing an inter-temporal trade-off between improving the quality of infor-mation acquisition and mitigating relationship breakdown risks. The dynamically optimal sequenceof payment contracts can be uniquely determined provided that the quality of contract enforcementinstitutions is sufficiently low.
Schlagwörter: 
Payment contracts
Trade credit
Trade dynamics
Relational contracts
Contract enforcement
JEL: 
L14
F34
G32
D83
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-331-5
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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