Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/21517
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Mariotti, Marco | en |
dc.contributor.author | Manzini, Paola | en |
dc.contributor.author | Fella, Giulio | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T16:23:07Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T16:23:07Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2002 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21517 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper we derive an explicit model of negotiations between spouses when utility is (partially) transferable only in case of separation. We show that inefficient separation may occur in equilibrium even under consensual divorce law. This provides theoretical support for the view that changes in social norms rather than in legislation may be responsible for increasing divorce rates. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x439 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C78 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J12 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Bargaining | en |
dc.subject.keyword | divorce | en |
dc.subject.keyword | non transferability | en |
dc.subject.stw | Eherecht | en |
dc.subject.stw | Familienökonomik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Privater Transfer | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verhandlungstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Scheidung | en |
dc.title | Does Divorce Law Matter? | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 845016660 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
Files in This Item:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.