Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/215911 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 335
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
We provide a novel intuition for why manufacturers restrict their retailers' ability to resell brandproducts online. Our approach builds on models of limited attention according to which pricedisparities across distribution channels guide a consumer's attention toward prices and lower herappreciation for quality. Thus, absent vertical restraints, one out of two distortions - a quality ora participation distortion - can arise in equilibrium. We show that, by ruling out both distortions,vertical restraints can be socially desirable, but can also hurt consumers through higher retail prices.Thereby, we identify a novel trade-off between efficiency and consumer surplus.
Schlagwörter: 
Limited Attention
Online Sales
Antitrust
Vertical Restraints
JEL: 
D21
K21
L42
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-334-6
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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