Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/216429 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 13117
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
To finance unemployment insurance, states raise payroll tax rates on employers who engage in layoffs. Tax rates are, therefore, highest for firms after downturns, potentially hampering labor-market recovery. Using full-population, administrative records from Florida, I estimate the effect of these tax increases on firm behavior leveraging a regression kink design in the tax schedule. Tax hikes reduce hiring and employment substantially, with no effect on layoffs or wages. The results imply unanticipated costs of the financing regime which reduce the optimal benefit by a quarter and account for twelve percent of the unemployment in the wake of the Great Recession.
Schlagwörter: 
unemployment insurance
payroll taxes
recession
JEL: 
D22
H22
H25
H71
J23
J32
J38
J65
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.01 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.